The Fukushima catastrophe is a turning point in the conception, role and management of technology in industrial societies. As did Hiroshima (on another dimension) after 1945, the Fukushima's nuclear accident questions and transforms established conceptions and values concerning the relations between technology, politics, industry, society and the environment.
institutions. The financing of political parties by utilities companies is a part of this scandal; it is one cause, among others, of the disaster, more important even than the earthquake and the tsunami. Of course Naoto Kan's last tenkô had no meaning because he was leaving office at the end of August 2011.
Today, a year after the catastrophe, the nuclear industry has not renounced its objectives: nuclear energy is still promoted as the best and only solution for Japan. This industry now justifies its role and explains its mission as managing the transition between a fossil fuel energy system and the next, green, one. This sounds reasonably true, very similar to the German and Swiss cases. But in the case of Japan, as a result of the complete loss of trust between the population, utilities industries and the state, this is not anymore the main issue: the contamination is here and the transition might last for ever. The real danger is the power of sovereign industries controlling a sovereign technology built in the administration as a power structure.
This danger might seem exaggerated. But a recent example proves how high and wide the risk is. It proves also the cynicism of these industries and the extent of their control over the nation. It involves the legal system. The newspaper Asahi Shimbun 4 has reported a legal procedure opposing TEPCO and the owner of a golf course, who is suing the utility company because his golf course situated at forty-five kilometers from Fukushima is contaminated and had to be closed to the public. TEPCO lawyers reject this claim on the ground that the radioactive substances emanating from the Fukushima-Daiishi plant do not belong to the company once they are in the atmosphere and pushed by the wind. The company argues that these substances are to be considered as "res nullius", things, which belong to no one, like "mist in the sky or fish in high seas". Even worse is the following argument: "even if usual property law would apply to such substances, they are by now incorporated to the ground.
Therefore TEPCO cannot be taken as being anymore the owner of these particles". A Court of justice rejected the claim of the plaintive on October 31 st . The only benefit of this decision is that everybody in Japan knows from now on which side the justice system stands.
Finally, this power structure associates the media, which are largely financed and influenced by utilities companies. As explained in many studies and articles, by its scale, its level of investment and its intrinsic danger, nuclear power is both a technology and an industry to which a power structure identifies with and is ready to invest in (Shiokura 2011).
This techno-structure concentrates the financial means, the knowledge and the power to build nuclear plants, manage these plants, distribute energy and manage all these individuals and groups, industries and other economic activities, which consume energy. Nuclear energy is the perfect match for a strong and unified power structure. What really happened at Fukushima is the public exhibition of the power structure controlling and managing Japanese society and economy. The power structure is naked and tries to find new clothes 5 . This was always known, in Japan and elsewhere 6 . What is revealed as false and wrong are the information, explanations, justifications and reports produced and distributed by utilities companies, by ministries and the media all these years, as well as the willingness of large 4 French translation : "A Fukushima, il faut savoir écouter les irradiés", Paris, Courrier international, n° 1105, 5-12 January 2012, p 32. I translate from the French. 5 The debate on reconstruction is beyond the scope of this paper. 6 Like in Japan, the nuclear industry and other utilities industries in France are fully embedded in the state apparatus, in its internal connections with industry and research. The two leading political parties do not dare to challenge their power.
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parts of the population to believe what they were told. People decided to believe them because they needed the jobs or simply because they were not asked if these plants could be built in their neighborhoods. What is at stake after Fukushima, is our present conception, institutions and practice of democracy.
The metaphysics of risk
What really happened at Fukushima-Daiishi is not an internal Japanese affair: a conceptual complex replicated in all advanced industrial nations was torn apart like the buildings covering the nuclear reactors. It organizes and manages the interactions between research, industry, government and society. It is composed of three sets of discourses, a discourse on risk, one on trust, the third is the ideology, vision and program of a "knowledge society". The three are closely aggregated. These notions encompass a series of issues, theories and policies. Fukushima has opened the possibility to analyze each of them, how they are connected in a powerful conception of society, technology, politics and the economy.
They are so deeply embedded in our societies that each of them has been since the 1980s the subject of an influential book, which opened until today strong debates and research in politics and the media and social sciences. This popular metaphysics has a long history. It was best expressed by Martin
Heidegger's conception of technology (Heidegger 1977) . In 1950, after Nazism, the Second World War, the Holocaust and Hiroshima, the German philosopher was denouncing the folly of modern humanity of "enframing" 7 (Gestell) nature, to dominate and control nature. Nature is objectified by modern science and then reduced by technology to resources to exploit, accumulate and distribute. For Heidegger, the source of this folly is Western metaphysics, which he contrasts to ancient Greece's conception of humanity living in harmony with nature.
Heidegger's philosophy had and still has a great influence: the Fukushima catastrophe seems to prove him right and ground his philosophy. In his essay on technology, Heidegger gives as example a dam on the river Rhine: it enframes not only the water flow but the myths and imagination of a whole culture and society 8 . Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear plant is a perfect substitute for the dam on the Rhine. But this metaphysics has two main drawbacks: utilities companies share the same idea: Nature is overwhelming and cannot be enframed without high risk; it dissimulates the real question, which does not concern the power of nature but the power of utilities companies on society and the economy. Any Heideggerian discourse on the Fukushima catastrophe is ineffective.
An updated and refined expression of this metaphysics is found in Ulrich Beck's influential book, Risikogesellschaft (1986) (The risk society). He developed an alternative perspective on the problems raised by Heidegger and his commentators. The strength of the book is to propose a broad conception of risk, from ecological and industrial risk to social and individual risk, including the evolution of the family, sexuality and new forms of subjectivity.
The notion of risk becomes a picture and a vision of the various evolutions reshaping industrial societies since the 1980s. In this perspective, risk cannot be reduced to the precautionary principle and to risk analysis. Deeper than an ideology, it is a metaphysics looming over all industrial societies. Beck's goal is to conceptualize from a sociological point of view this new « modern social order 9 » (part 3). The source of these transformations is the ecological transition, which erupted in the 1970s with the first massive energy crisis. Today, especially since 2006, this energy crisis has proved its full depth and massive impact: it has altered the conditions of economic and social development of all industrial societies. This evolution justified and still justifies nuclear energy.
The energy and ecological challenge has replaced the metaphysics of nature and its nostalgia. This crisis has driven industrial societies beyond the historical opposition between external risks (natural disasters) and internal risks proper to techno-industrial societies, whether "old", "mature" or "newly industrialized". Ulrich Beck explained in the 1980s that this opposition between external and internal risks had vanished. It had become an obstacle to a proper understanding of the present social, economical and ecological condition of industrial societies. Natural risks could be assessed, some of them prevented or at least reduced. Today these risks are internalized within modern societies. They cannot be interpreted as natural or external accidents: social and economic systems are responsible for most natural disasters, from flooding due to deforestation and anarchic urbanization to global warming due to carbon emissions by industries and unsustainable energy consumption, due to transport and urban, suburban and even rural life styles. This is true all over the planet, in rich and poor countries. Social and economic systems are themselves the source of various natural catastrophes, from the Chernobyl paradigmatic case to extinction of natural species due to extensive use of pesticides in intensive agriculture, overexploitation of lands and potential food shortages due to the production of bio-fuel.
The overcoming of the opposition between nature and society, between two distinct and conflicting orders 10 , is breaching a deep anthropological order, at least in Western societies. The notion of risk expresses this transgression. What was called "nature" until recently has become the ecology of social and economic systems, which are destabilizing the biophysical conditions of life on the planet. Ulrich Beck interprets this diagnosis as proof of a new modernity: all social and economic problems are ecological problems, the reverse being also true. They have become one single and multi-faceted process, which has extended the level of risk and disequilibrium beyond institutional control and political management. The highest risk is that disequilibrium could initiate an irreversible and uncontrollable evolution.
The problem is not that various human activities have the potential of ecological and social 9 It is also a response and refutation of post-modern cultural studies (Beck, Giddens, Lash, 1994) On the contrary, the response to problems articulating science and technology, society, politics and industry calls for the formation of an advanced democracy.
The paradox of trust
Facing and managing risk, as metaphysics or object of research and debate, raise the question of trust, trust in science and technology, in political institutions, in the economic system. The question of trust has reemerged in industrial societies since the 1980s. Trust has a long history, dating from Fides, the Roman goddess of all contracts. Trust is also a typical liberal notion, dating back to the role of consent and reciprocity in early liberal thinkers, source of modern democratic theory. For Locke (1690), consent and trust are the basic human bond 12 . Trust is at once the experience, decision and will, which grounds and makes life in common possible. Revisiting trust today is therefore a diagnosis on contemporary societies.
Like risk in Ulrich Beck's book, the question of "trust" is related to a historical moment and to an influential book written by Francis Fukuyama (1995). Sign of times, in the introduction, Fukuyama declares it to be a "book on economics", not in political theory. In a few years, trust would become a worldwide field of research and debate. After having predicted the "end of history" when the Soviet Union had collapsed and China turned to a market economy, F. Fukuyama was now trying to explain the emergence and consequences of the neo-liberal movement. Since the 1980s, neo-liberalism was revolutionizing, one after the other, all industrial societies, including former communist nations. As we still remember, it was supposed to open an age of worldwide economic growth and political freedom. F.
Fukuyama's intention was to explain that neo-liberalism could not be reduced to a set of economic techniques to be learned and applied around the globe. It was based on culture and values, on those "social virtues" best exemplified in American history: a strong work ethics (p 45) and a "spontaneous sociability" (p 46) had created "an art of association" between hard work and knowledge in successful entrepreneurial projects. Trust was supposed to be the key explanation of the spirit of American capitalism. This spirit was cultural, deeper than history, customs and institutions. But this culture of capitalism was not an ethnic feature proper to a given people or civilization: it could spread to other nations, be adapted and adopted. societies is based on "sustaining sociability" between large groups of people. This is the ideal version of the "melting pot", the model of a political community of individuals.
For Fukuyama, America is obviously a nation based on high-trust and strong collective sociability. But his diagnosis expresses anxiety: high-trust is starting to erode.
Fukuyama does not explain if neo-liberalism is the sickness or the cure because, at this stage of his political and philosophical evolution, the sickness has its source in social policies, which had been eroding US competitiveness and made individuals less able and willing to solve by themselves their economic and social problem. Neo-liberal policies were still considered the cure: it was supposed to make people freer and stronger and the US more competitive.
As a vision of society, neo-liberalism is a rearrangement of the relations and hierarchies between society, government, the economy as well as religion. This vision and ideology had a major influence on all industrial nations. But this increased differentiation has introduced a void and a gap at the core of society. It made societies more flexible. But the various functions constituting a social system do not fit anymore into a coherent whole. common in contemporary society is reduced to a conception of justice and fairness, to a subjectively acceptable degree of equality or inequality. The second consequence was mainly seen in the US, even it can also be observed in other regions and countries. This emptying of society and the resulting personal anxieties generated a wide return to religion. Religion became a last refuge for many of those who were losing their jobs and social identity. As a result, faith became more intimate, radical and irrational. Religion itself was transformed: it is atomized in many competing religious sects, churches and spiritual movements, often associated to various right wing political groups. Established churches cannot control this evolution.
The third evolution is the reinvention of the modern ideal of "civil society", of the capacity of individuals and groups to find between themselves, at their own level and in their immediate communities, the capacity and the will to develop solidarities, common projects and common forms of resistance, mainly against government and businesses. Neo-liberalism is not all economic: it is also characterized everywhere by strong social movements for the environment, against pollution and nuclear energy, for food safety, against GMOs, or against new fields of medical research (like stem cells), against tyranny and corruption. There are strong interactions, and confusion, between these expressions of "civil society", religion, ethics and social movements. This return of "civil society" is highly significant even if the themes associating people mainly concern their immediate lives and interests. What is significant is strong commitment and active resistance 13 . This surge and reinvention of civil society in each neo-liberal evolution might be the most enduring consequence of neoliberalism.
In this context, the question of "trust" has become a major issue. Since the 1980s, trust has become a major requirement in business and politics, superseding traditional respect for social elites and even for competence. But trust remains a personal experience according to which individuals judge politicians, professors, experts, companies and their managers. A neo-liberal society might strengthen for a given moment the economy but the social basis of this economy is unstable and its political legitimacy basically weak, constantly questioned. It is a paradox: this surge in economic activities experienced since the 1980s rests on a fragile social basis, because society is reduced to an experience of trust, on ethical values and is judged according to benefits to individuals and groups. In the case of Japan, the long-term crisis, political failures and the Fukushima catastrophe have destroyed trust in institutions. But it has also reinforced the need and hope for "civil society", for interactions between individuals and groups outside and against the present power structure. This situation is opening a collective search for democratic progress. If this search is betrayed, Japan will simply decline and indefinitely lose ground.
Neo-liberalism has emptied society and reduced the social experience to anxiety and frustration, distrust and even treason. The 2007 systemic crisis and now the Fukushima catastrophe reinforce and justify this individual and collective experience. This instills a volatile situation, which can lead to irrational behaviors and demands as well as violence.
Democracy is basically a political technology to associate individuals and groups in order to manage conflicts and reach decisions accepted by all parties involved. Neo-liberalism contradicts this basic conception of democracy but at the same time this very conception of democracy is the only solution opened to manage and solve the problems created by this neoliberal social regime. One thing is clear: neo-liberalism has reached its level of contradiction and has become counter-productive. Both discourses on risk and trust lead therefore to the same problem: reinventing democracy.
Knowledge society versus knowledge economy
These two discourses of risk and trust are closely associated to science and technology. The third component of the conceptual complex articulating today the relations between science, technology, society and the economy is both an ideology and a program, the idea of "knowledge society". Since the 1980s, research and innovation policies are supposed to drive industrial societies beyond their present economic and social problems. Today they are supposed to bring solutions to ecological challenges and to provide innovations capable of restoring competitiveness, of creating new industries. These industries are supposed to create jobs paying for new taxes, which will finance social programs as well as these science and technology policies in an endless spiral of innovation and progress. This ideal vision and its related policies have different names: the formation of a "high-added value economy" or "knowledge economy", more generally "knowledge society" (Rieu, 2005 generates "a shift in demand that will favor the consumption of knowledge value rather than natural resources" (introduction). The added value extracted from research and innovation has always in the past and would continue in the future to supersede the value of natural resources. Today this idea is considered so obvious that it is not even questioned anymore.
In the late 1980s, Christopher Freeman (1987, 1988) This evolution is a deep and probably irreversible mutation in the evolution of science and technology, in their relations to politics, society, culture and the economy. Ulrich Beck in the third part (chapter 7) of Risk society (1986) presents some epistemological aspects of this mutation, but in the mid 1980s, the historical scale of this mutation could not be foreseen. between sovereign industries and society, but also between these industries and those institutions, which since the 1990s are orienting Japan in a different direction. Indeed these programs heavily finance and promote research on new energy sources, energy and transport.
To associate the population in the design of these large-scale policies policies remains a difficult challenge. But the reason for it is clear: first, the global cost of potential failure is too high. Public trust in these policies is considered essential. It can certainly be misled but, as proven by the case of GMOs, the risk of open public opposition is counter-productive.
Various studies show that people trust scientists and researchers more than the institutions for which their work. Secondly, the intellectual competence and the level of financial investment required for implementing such large-scale research and innovation policies are so high that the resulting trajectory is or is nearly irreversible. A society, which designs such large-scale policies, is therefore taking an extreme risk, the risk of a long-term dependency path. The only solution to manage such a risk is to share it amongst the largest possible amount of people. The only solution is to manage such a policy as an experiment in advanced democracy. We reach again the conjuncture described by Callon, Lascoume & Barthe (2001 . These small-scale experiments are a forerunner of major political reforms adapted to the growing environmental constraint, to comprehensive research and innovation policies and to the resulting transformations of social and economic systems. Such reforms and innovations are obviously part of the solution to overcome the Fukushima catastrophe and also the present systemic crisis.
After Fukushima
The Fukushima catastrophe is opening a deep epistemic shift in human and social sciences. The conceptual complex regulating the evolution of industrial societies through science and technology policies is under deconstruction. The presuppositions and limitations of its three components, a theory of risk, a conception of trust and the idea of "knowledge society" are now exposed to public scrutiny. The apparent rationality, efficiency and legitimacy of this complex failed to anticipate, prevent and respond to this disaster. Its real function was to dissimulate the power structure behind. To analyze these networks of mutual interests and supports is an exercise in democracy. The deconstruction of this conceptual complex is opening a different conceptual framework based on analysis of power networks, on alternative interactions between science, technology and society, and on a theory of democracy adapted to a society driven by research and innovation policies. The challenge is now to prove the validity of this new conceptual framework.
The most urgent task concerns nuclear energy and industry. According to this new framework, we should not even debate whether nuclear energy is safe, clean or not. It is not the real problem anymore. As society, individuals are always in need of trust and trust is an unreachable goal. Our societies will never know the truth about nuclear safety. The issue is not to trust nuclear industries or not, but to learn how to collectively manage uncertainty. One thing is known for sure: society will never be able to control a sovereign technology and sovereign industries, which require an aggregation of power and resources beyond political oversight. Such a power structure cannot be controlled by a democratic society. Therefore nuclear technology and industry defy and deny democracy. This is the reason why nuclear plants should be closed and the nuclear industry stalled as long as advanced industrial societies have not imagined and implemented the political reforms able to produce knowledge, organize debate and implement reliable democratic control with respect to this technology. For the moment, a democratic society should not develop sovereign industries it cannot control. Concerning nuclear energy, before real democratic innovations are implemented, alternative energies will probably develop and mature. Societies will then be able to compare which energy sources are best adapted to a democratic society. In the present situation, nuclear energy is a technology of the past, a legacy of the 20 th century. 
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